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This article is concerned with state-sponsored electoral violence in liberalised 
autocracies. The first section of the paper identifies a number of variables that 
can help explain the decision calculus of authoritarian incumbents to deploy 
force against strong electoral challengers. The second section then examines 
these propositions with reference to Egypt and Morocco. Drawing on recent 
parliamentary elections in both countries the article questions why, despite 
facing the challenge of political Islam, the two regimes differed so markedly in 
their willingness to manipulate the polls by recourse to violence. Whilst the 
Egyptian authorities decided to abrogate all pretence of peaceful elections in 
favour of violent repression against the Muslim Brotherhood candidates and 
sympathisers, no such tactics were deployed by the ruling elite in Morocco. We 
suggest that three principal factors influenced the regimes' response to this 
electoral challenge: (1) the centrality of the elected institution to authoritarian 
survival, (2) the availability of alternative electioneering tools and (3) the 
anticipated response of the international community. The article concludes by 
suggesting that in order to understand better when and how states deploy 
violence in elections, we need to focus on a more complex set of factors rather 
than simply on the electoral potency of key opposition challengers or the 
authoritarian nature of the state.  
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Introduction 
The phenomenon of violence in elections is one of many paradoxes with which 
political scientists have to grapple. Whilst theoretically the notions of elections and 
violence seem incompatible, in practice they often go hand in hand. Multiparty 
elections epitomise efforts at managing political conflict by non-violent means, and 
are commonly regarded as the ultimate remedy for conflict in society. Yet reality is 
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often multifaceted, with outbursts of violence accompanying elections at various 
stages of the process, either in the lead-up to, during or in the aftermath of polling 
day.  
The phenomenon itself is as old as the electoral principle. It was as much a 
feature of elections in ancient Rome, the Victorian era and nineteenth century 
America, as it sadly remains in modern times.1 Acts of violence causing death and 
destruction have in the past marred elections in countries across continents and 
different political systems, and continue to do so. And yet the phenomenon has 
evoked limited scholarly interest. As Rapoport and Weinberg remark, despite a 
plethora of research on political violence, there is a paucity of comparative studies on 
its ‘little brother’, electoral violence.2 The only analyses at hand are those by 
Rapoport and Weinberg themselves and a number of studies addressing the issue of 
electoral violence in conflict and transitional settings.3 Even less is available when it 
comes to the phenomenon of state-sponsored electoral violence. A few case studies 
apart, no academic work exists which broadly explores the question of when and why 
states resort to coercion in elections.4   
In keeping with the theme of the special issue, this article examines the third 
area of research spelled out by Schwarzmantel in his introductory contribution: 
‘violence as a challenge to democracy’. According to Schwarzmantel this challenge 
carries two dimensions. As far as liberal democracies are concerned the challenge of 
violent politics emanates primarily from social movements seeking better inclusion 
and recognition within the polity, whilst in non-democracies or in liberalising 
countries where uncertainty over the process is high it is often the regime itself which 
resorts to violence as a means of securing authoritarian survival.  
Focusing on the later scenario, this article explores state sponsorship of 
political violence in elections with a specific focus on the Arab world where we can 
observe, paradoxically, both the persistence of authoritarianism and a significant 
increase in electoral contests. The article puts forward a number of variables that can 
help explain why and when authoritarian incumbents deploy violent electioneering 
tactics as a means of ‘carving the democratic heart out of the electoral contest’.5  
Essentially, we suggest that one ought to look beyond the nature of authoritarianism 
and the electoral potency of opposition challengers to understand the conditions under 
which states are likely to resort to such tactics. Three factors are identified that may 
explain state sponsorship of electoral violence. First, we focus on the institutional 
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framework in a given country and consider the centrality and effective policy-making 
powers of the elected institutions for authoritarian elites. How important is the 
institution for which elections are held? Second, we explore the availability of 
alternative electioneering devices falling short of the resort to force, and how the 
regime employs such alternatives to manage the election process. Finally, we 
emphasise that domestic decision-making takes into account the anticipated response 
of the international community to the use of electoral fraud in general and of electoral 
violence in particular.  
This theoretical framework is then examined in the context of recent 
parliamentary elections in Egypt (2005) and Morocco (2007). The two cases lend 
themselves to an exploratory analysis of state-sponsored election violence for a 
number of reasons. To begin with, they are both authoritarian countries with a 
liberalising agenda and can be defined as ‘liberalised autocracies.’6 Second, they are 
representative of the political dynamics in many countries across the Arab world 
where existing regimes are somehow able to survive despite the lack of popular 
legitimacy and the presence of a strong Islamist opposition. Third, the two countries, 
like many others in the region, have increasingly taken elections seriously over the 
last decade because of both domestic and international pressures for reform. Finally, 
the two countries are paradigmatic of the two types of regime we find in the region. 
Morocco represents the political and institutional dynamics that we find in Arab 
monarchies where rulers are unelected and where legitimacy can be characterised as 
‘traditional.’ Egypt exemplifies the manner in which politics takes place in 
authoritarian republics where ‘strong’ presidents are elected and have to deal with 
specific electoral constraints. This allows for an examination of how electoral contests 
occur in the two countries and how authoritarian incumbents respond to strong 
challengers at the ballot box.  
 
Electoral potency, threat perceptions and state-sponsored violence in 
authoritarian elections  
This article adopts a simplified decision-theoretic approach to the study of state-
sponsored violence in authoritarian elections. It assumes that authoritarian incumbents 
are rational actors whose principal objective is to remain in power and whose decision 
to resort to, tolerate or refrain from violence against political opponents is a strategic 
choice amongst many to ensure regime survival. State-sponsored violence is thus 
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neither irrational nor indiscriminate, but constitutes a course of action that is 
deliberate and usually targeted at opposition forces perceived as posing a most serious 
threat to authoritarian incumbency. 
We define electoral violence as acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or 
physical harm perpetrated to affect the process and/or outcome of an election. The 
instigators of such violence can include both state actors (police, secret services, 
armed forces) and non-state actors (e.g. political parties and guerrilla, rebel or 
paramilitary groups). Where the former is involved we are dealing with so-called 
state-sponsored electoral violence. This is a form of political violence instigated 
either directly by the state authorities or by regime proxies, such as militias, ruling 
parties, regime-hired troublemakers, and so forth. Following Gartner and Regan7 we 
have included regime proxies in our definition of state-sponsored violence based on 
the assumption that the central authorities hold significant sway over these agents and 
their actions.  
With few exceptions, it appears that most instances of state-sponsored 
electoral violence occur in non-democratic regimes.8 Illustrative cases in point are the 
coercive tactics recently employed by authoritarian incumbents in elections in 
Zimbabwe (2008) and Ethiopia (2000).9 For these regimes, as for any electoral 
autocracy, authoritarian survival in a liberalised environment is of paramount concern, 
and resorting to violence in elections constitutes one of several illegitimate strategies 
to secure this survival at the ballot box. Alongside ballot fraud and vote buying, brute 
force, or the failure to prevent it, is often used by the authorities and/or their proxies 
to distort the electoral competition in favour of regime-supportive forces and to quell 
any post-election outburst of popular anger at the rigging of the election result, as 
happened for instance in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential poll in Iran. Acts of 
regime-perpetrated electoral violence can take various forms, ranging from targeted 
killings of prominent opposition figures, the physical disruption of opposition rallies, 
the beating and/or arbitrary arrest of opposition candidates and sympathisers, to 
coercive measures aimed at preventing voters from casting their ballots.  
When deployed by authoritarian incumbents, the overall objectives and targets 
of state-sponsored violence in elections are thus relatively easy to discern. Usually the 
overriding aim is to neutralise key electoral challengers and the targets of such 
violence are those opposition forces perceived as posing the greatest threat to the 
electoral status quo. What is more difficult to determine however, and of interest here, 
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is the decision-calculus that drives authoritarian elites to use force as an electioneering 
tool in the first place, particularly as it is the regime itself that has decided on holding 
multiparty elections. Is it possible to predict a state’s propensity to resort to violence 
in elections? If so, when and how do authoritarian incumbents determine that the 
benefits of deploying force outweigh both the loss of domestic legitimacy that 
invariably goes hand in hand with this repressive strategy, and the possible ire of the 
international community?   
For authoritarian rulers the very notion of opposition is suspect and treated as 
a potential or real threat to regime survival. Obviously, the degree to which autocrats 
tolerate political opposition is contingent on the nature of authoritarianism (closed vs. 
competitive autocracies) and the types of demands articulated by their opponents.10 
Pliant and weak opposition parties, for instance, which are allowed to garner a limited 
number of seats in parliament in return for their aquiescence in the existing order, 
pose no serious electoral challenge to incumbent regimes and are thus essentially non-
threatening. In fact, some scholars have argued that, where allowed to operate, these 
opposition forces help sustain a veneer of democratic governance within inherently 
autocratic structures and as such prolong rather than endanger regime survival.11 The 
situation may change dramatically, however, wherever the electoral potency of the 
opposition is enhanced, that is where non-regime forces show any real sign of grass-
roots support, organisational capacity, and/or willingness to challenge the boundaries 
of acceptable dissent. In these circumstances then, authoritarian incumbents are faced 
with real challengers at the ballot box.  
At first glance it therefore appears that electoral potency features critically in 
the decision-calculus of autocrats to use force against challengers in elections. And 
indeed, with the electoral equilibrium under threat, authoritarian governments may be 
tempted to deploy repressive means to sustain the electoral status quo. Yet electoral 
potency on its own cannot explain the choice of violence. One could, for instance, 
conceive of a strong opposition being allowed to do well in elections simply because 
the institution for which parties are competing is constitutionally relatively powerless. 
Equally, one could think of the role that political parties actually play in any political 
system, contrasting regimes reliant on a ruling party to ones based on unelected 
decision-makers such as monarchs. These regimes may inevitably view electoral 
competition and its challenges very differently and thus diverge in their readiness to 
resort to force during an election.  
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It is thus apparent that other important factors must be considered in order to 
fully understand the decision-making rationale of authoritarian incumbents in 
resorting to violence in elections. As mentioned earlier, we propose three variables 
that may help explain when electoral potency turns into an electoral threat which from 
the regime’s point of view warrants violent repression. The first variable to examine is 
the centrality for authoritarian survival of the institution for which parties and 
candidates are competing. Authoritarian rulers have to identify the importance of the 
institution and decide whether losing power within it would undermine significantly 
their legitimacy and ability to rule unhindered. It becomes therefore important to 
determine where the particular institution is located in terms of its constitutional 
relevance. Accordingly, in a political system where the executive and legislative 
powers are elected and mutually interdependent, the stakes of electoral competition 
are quite high because the authoritarian incumbent could conceivably have much to 
lose if a strong opposition were to take advantage of even limited openings. This has 
been the case for instance in Algeria in 1990 when the Islamic Salvation Front 
(known by its French acronym FIS) won the legislative elections. The number of seats 
it won would have given the party the possibility to change the constitution. The 
Algerian parliament was therefore a very significant institution and its ‘loss’ to the 
Islamists was countered with significant violence. Conversely, in the context of a 
political system where the main executive institution is beyond electoral politics, as in 
executive monarchies, electoral competition for the legislature might not constitute a 
significant challenge to the authoritarian incumbent because formal legitimacy derives 
from other sources. Thus, a monarch might be more willing and even encourage 
effective pluralism.12 The Jordanian elections reflect this logic, as supreme executive 
powers are in the hands of the monarch who uses parties in parliament to selectively 
support his policies.  
The second factor to examine concerns the nature of the electoral contest itself 
and the tools available to incumbents to influence its outcome. Elections in 
authoritarian systems have the overarching objective of fostering regime legitimacy, 
but they can be either threatening or legitimising.13 Threatening elections mean that 
authoritarian incumbents have been forced to open up the political system defensively 
due to either domestic or external pressures or both, and the electoral competition 
becomes therefore a potentially dangerous test of popularity. The ruling elite in this 
case is very aware of the potentially snowballing effects of such elections if they do 
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not deliver results that make survival possible, and is willing to influence the outcome 
with all the means at his disposal, including violence. On the contrary, legitimising 
elections serve the purpose of demonstrating the existence of political pluralism, and 
whilst incumbents also attempt to control the results, such results do not have the 
same significance. First the regime’s legitimacy rests elsewhere and, second, it is 
precisely by allowing a degree of effective pluralism that incumbents derive both 
domestic and international benefits. In this case the instrument of violence would be 
damaging to the survival of the regime because it would indicate that the other tools 
to remain in power are no longer effective.  
The third and final factor has to do with the international response which 
authoritarian elites must anticipate when deploying force against political opponents.  
For authoritarian regimes the recourse to violence as an electioneering tool not only 
carries domestic risks, but can also incur significant external costs. These costs can 
range from moral condemnation to the withdrawal of vital economic and military aid, 
the suspension of bilateral/multilateral trade agreements or the imposition of 
economic and/or political sanctions.14 
No liberalising regime that breaches the norms of electoral good governance is 
likely to escape some form of international condemnation. In the past, Western 
governments have on numerous occasions issued statements reminding the regimes in 
question of their commitment to free and fair elections. The real issue, therefore, is 
not so much whether offending regimes will be reprimanded, but whether key 
Western allies are prepared to impose negative sanctions in order to pressure 
authoritarian incumbents to improve their rights record in elections. Two factors may 
play into the decision of whether and when Western governments are prepared to do 
so. First, it may depend on whether or not regime repression is perceived as a 
democratisation-threatening or a democratisation-saving exercise. If it is the latter, 
then some form of repression against political opponents, including the use of force, 
may be tolerated and would not damage the overall democratising legitimacy of 
authoritarian incumbents. Second, Western governments may also shy away from 
deploying negative sanctions against regimes considered ‘pivotal states’ in a geo-
strategic sense.15 Here again, authoritarian stability and the survival of a pro-Western 
government may outweigh any concern for democratic reforms, particularly if such 
reforms would benefit forces perceived as inherently anti-Western. In both scenarios 
then, the external costs of violent repression are likely to be short-term and limited, 
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and unlikely to damage the rulers’ overall credentials as democratising regimes or 
their strategic partnership with the West.  
 
Regime violence in Egypt’s 2005 parliamentary elections  
 
Egypt last went to the polls in autumn 2005 to elect a new president and lower house 
of parliament. The months leading to the polls were marked by an air of measured 
optimism that the voting experience would be qualitatively different from past 
elections. Whilst no-one assumed that Mubarak would lose the presidency or the 
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) its stranglehold over the legislature, 
developments in and outside the country nonetheless suggested that this time around 
there would be no ‘election-business as usual’. Confronted with an emboldened 
reform movement at home and a US administration eager to see Egypt take a lead in 
regional democratisation efforts, the regime found itself under unprecedented pressure 
to organise clean and peaceful elections.16   
At first, this pressure appeared to be having the desired effect. In February 
2005 Mubarak unexpectedly announced a reform of the presidential election law, 
opening the presidency to multi-candidate contestation. The elections themselves, 
which took place on September 7th, were hailed by the international community as a 
significant step towards democracy and seen as evidence that Mubarak was 
committed to cleaner elections. Observers lauded the calm and overall openness that 
prevailed throughout the campaigning period and on polling day itself, and 
commented positively on the fact that opposition candidates were allowed to 
campaign relatively unhindered.17  
Little over a month later, the parliamentary election campaign seemed to kick-
off to a similarly encouraging start. Yet again the regime appeared more relaxed about 
opposition activism than in the past, granting it an exceptional margin of freedom 
during the campaigning period. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, long vilified by the 
government, enjoyed unprecedented freedom during the campaign, with the group’s 
candidates and cadres being allowed to canvass their message relatively openly and 
without the usual government interference and intimidation.18 It thus appeared that the 
upcoming poll would run peacefully and that the new legislature would be more 
pluralist than its predecessors.  
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This was not to be, however. Far from passing peacefully, Egypt bore witness 
to an election that was marred by the most serious outbreak of political violence since 
the 1995 parliamentary poll. By the time the polling stations closed on 9 December 
2005, the elections had cost 11 lives and left over 500 people wounded in scores of 
violent clashes.19 According to observers on the ground, most of the violence took 
place in rounds two and three of the voting and involved in a vast majority of 
instances the Egyptian security forces and NDP-hired trouble-makers on the one side 
and Brotherhood candidates and their supporters on the other.20 In fact, the ferocity 
with which this violence pitted the regime and its proxies against the Islamist 
opposition constituted a sad hallmark of the 2005 parliamentary elections. Whilst not 
immune to regime interference, none of the other opposition parties contesting the 
elections were party to, or the target of, the scores of clashes that occurred between 
regime and Islamists.21 
This raises the question of how to explain the sudden and unexpected outburst 
of political violence in the later phases of the 2005 parliamentary elections. To be 
sure, election-related violence is not uncommon in Egypt, and by comparison the 
2005 parliamentary poll was not even the most bloody. What is so remarkable about 
these elections and in need of explanation, however, is the fact that the violence broke 
out so late in the election process and that it stood in sharp contrast to the relative 
quiet and openness that had prevailed during the campaigning period.  
 
Table 1: Casualties of electoral violence, 1995-2005 
Parliamentary Elections  Deaths Injured 
1995 80 1,500
2000 10 64
2005 11-13 500
Sources: Thabet, H. G. 2006. ‘Egyptian Parliamentary Elections: Between 
Democratization and Autocracy.’ African Development 31/3, p. 19; Egyptian 
Organisation for Human Rights, Future Parliamentary Victims: EOHR’s Report on 
Fact-Finding Mission to Monitor Results for 2005 Future Parliamentary Victims in the 
Governorates, Cairo: 30 January 2006, http://www.eohr.org/report/. 
 
As far as state involvement is concerned, we posit that the use of force by the 
security services and NDP trouble-makers was calculated and targeted against the 
opposition group posing the gravest electoral threat to ruling party candidates. For the 
regime this threat emanated from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) which, by virtue of 
its exceptionally strong showing at the ballot box, endangered the NDP’s stranglehold 
over the legislature, which thus constituted such a key pillar of authoritarian survival. 
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Another important factor was that from the regime’s point of view the use of force 
against the MB was deemed both necessary and viable. It seemed necessary because 
so late in the election process the regime had run out of alternatives to turn the 
situation around and manufacture an NDP landslide. It was considered viable, because 
in this particular instance Cairo’s domestic threat perceptions coincided with 
American security concerns over rising ‘Islamist extremism’ in the region, which 
meant that Egypt was unlikely to come under fire from Washington over the 
deployment of repressive force against the Brotherhood and its sympathisers. 
It is widely recognised that the Muslim Brotherhood constitutes by far the 
most potent political threat to the regime.22 For Mubarak the MB has long lost its 
utility as a bulwark against leftist forces, and is nowadays regarded as a serious 
menace to the regime. Not only is the group greater than other opposition parties in its 
resource capacity (both human and financial), organisational reach and ability to 
muster grass-roots support, but also in the assertiveness with which it challenges the 
secular foundations of the Egyptian regime and its pro-Western foreign policy.23 
Tethering perilously close to the red-lines of ‘acceptable opposition behaviour’, the 
Muslim Brotherhood is thus susceptible to regime repression.24  
Whilst a total crackdown on the group has never been on the cards – primarily 
because this would drive the Islamists underground and cut off millions of Egyptian 
citizens from vital social services provided by the group – the authorities have always 
made it clear that serious MB forays into national politics would not be tolerated. The 
regime remains fiercely opposed to the notion of a legalised Muslim Brotherhood 
party and, although in past elections it did allow MB members to stand as 
independents, it has taken great care to contain their electoral potency.25 In the 
legislative elections of 1995 and 2000, for instance, the group was subjected to a 
systematic and unrelenting clampdown on its candidates and supporters. As a 
consequence of this and other forms of regime-perpetuated electoral malpractice, the 
group has had little success in translating its support on the Egyptian street into a 
meaningful presence in parliament. In 1995 the MB won just one and in 2000 
seventeen of the 444 elective assembly seats. 26  
However, with the authorities showing greater leniency towards the 
Brotherhood in the 2005 parliamentary election campaign, the group’s electoral 
fortunes improved dramatically. Early signs that MB candidates were benefitting en 
masse from less government interference transpired in the first round of voting, by the 
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end of which the group had captured 34 of the 164 available seats.27 For the MB this 
was a remarkable success, given that 67 percent of its candidates had won their 
electoral contests and that so early on in the polling process the group had already 
doubled the number of its representatives in the Egyptian legislature.  
The regime meanwhile must have read these first-round results with some 
alarm. Not only had the NDP fared relatively poorly, capturing ‘just’ 112 of all 
available seats,28 but there was a real danger that similar Brotherhood inroads in the 
rounds to come would cost the ruling party its two-thirds majority in parliament. As 
will be discussed below, this considerable majority has been critical to the survival of 
the Mubarak regime ever since the turn to multiparty politics.29  The danger of losing 
this majority then turned into a realistic prospect in the second round of voting, which 
still left the NDP 108 seats short of the 303 mandates needed. To defend its 
hegemonic position in the legislature, the NDP thus needed to capture at least 80 
percent of the remaining seats in the final round of voting, a percentage it had fallen 
far short of in rounds one and two. As documented in table 2, in the first round of 
voting the NDP won 68 and in the second round just 58 percent of all elective seats. 
The Brotherhood by contrast appeared to be on track to win a historic number of 
mandates, capturing a further 42 seats in the second phase of the polls. With the 
electoral tide turning against the NDP, and time running out, the regime thus felt 
compelled to revert to a well-tested strategy of violent repression in order to block any 
further Brotherhood inroads and secure election victory.30 Discounting the damage 
this sudden outburst of violence has done to the reform credentials of the Egyptian 
regime, it appears to have aided the NDP in securing the 303 mandates needed to 
retain its two-thirds majority in parliament.   
 
Table 2: NDP & MB inroads by voting phases (I – III) 
 NDP Gains MB Gains Total No. of 
Seats  of Candidates Seats Of Candidates Seats  
Phase I (112) 68% (1112) 68% (51) 67% (34) 21% 164 
Phase II (83) 58% (83) 58% (60) 70% (42) 29% 144 
Phase III  (110) 81% (110) 81% (49) 24% (12) 9% 136 
Total (305) 69% (305) 69% (160) 55% (88) 20% 2444 
Source: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Die Aegyptischen Parlamentswahlen 2005: III. Wahlgang, 22 December 2005, 
http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/18/1/year-2005/dokument_id-7763/index.html.  
1 Including NDP Independents.  
2 Includes only directly elected seats.  
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The determination of the Egyptian authorities to defend by all means 
necessary the NDP’s two-thirds majority in 2005 underscores the high stakes nature 
of legislative elections in presidential autocracies. In Egypt, parliament is 
constitutionally endowed with significant legislative and oversight powers which, if 
left unchecked, can seriously endanger the foundations of authoritarian rule. To 
prevent this from happening, and ensure parliament remains de facto subservient to 
the political executive, the regime relies on the NDP and its capacity to win two-thirds 
majorities at the ballot box. With this majority secured, Mubarak was able in the past 
to control the plenary debates and committee work in parliament and ensure that the 
opposition lacks the numerical strength to obstruct the passage of critical government 
legislation or to push through liberalising reforms, censor cabinet ministers or 
impeach the president.31 Crucially also, over the past three decades it has allowed 
Mubarak to govern by emergency rule, which must be granted and periodically 
renewed by the lower house of parliament with a two-thirds majority.32 Whilst the 
constitutional powers of the presidency are vast, these emergency provisions have 
endowed Mubarak with important additional tools to regulate and control political life 
without appearing illegal. Emergency powers allow the president to govern by decree, 
suspend basic civil liberties, censor the press and detain regime critics without trial, 
all for the ‘good’ of safeguarding national security and public order.33 In actual 
practice, of course, the regime has deployed most of these powers to tackle domestic 
opponents, including most prominently the Muslim Brotherhood.34 Critical to 
authoritarian survival, the capacity to govern by emergency rule was thus to be 
defended at all costs, if needed by resort to illegitimate vote-gaining strategies.  
As for the question of why the regime resorted to violence, the decision must 
be interpreted as a measure of last resort, conditioned by the absence of viable 
alternatives to manufacture desired election outcomes so late in the voting process and 
the minimal external costs this repressive strategy appeared to inflict on the Mubarak 
administration. As far as the former is concerned, it is likely that the unavailability of 
tawzir (ballot fraud) critically shaped the regime’s decision calculus to relinquish its 
commitment to peaceful elections. Ballot fraud, or ballot-box stuffing, is not only 
common in authoritarian elections, but where available, constitutes a most effective 
tool to correct unexpected and/or undesired opposition inroads until very late in the 
election process. In the event, however, the presence of judicial supervision rendered 
it very difficult, if not impossible, for the Egyptian authorities to resort to this 
 13
illegitimate electioneering device. Full judicial supervision had been introduced by 
the regime in 2000, following a Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) ruling that 
declared unconstitutional the practice of staffing ballot stations with government 
employees.35 With both the casting and counting of ballots outside its direct control, 
the regime in 2005 seemed starved of options to ‘correct’ the results in favour of the 
ruling party.  
The regime thus found itself caught between a rock and a hard place. Letting 
the election run its course could cost the NDP its two-thirds majority and land it with 
a potent opposition block in parliament. Resorting to dirty electioneering tactics to 
‘correct’ the election results, including the use of force, on the other hand, would 
further undermine the regime’s legitimacy at home and tarnish Mubarak’s carefully 
rebuilt image as a reform-minded leader abroad. In the end, the regime opted for what 
it must have perceived as the lesser of two dangers to authoritarian survival, cracking 
down harshly on the MB, its candidates and sympathisers.  
This decision was paired with the knowledge that a violent clamp-down on the 
MB would not carry any negative repercussions for Cairo’s close strategic relation 
with the USA. For although the Bush administration had singled out Egypt as a 
vanguard in renewed efforts to push for democratisation in the region, it was apparent 
that Washington did not wish to see the Mubarak regime replaced by an Islamist-led 
government that openly opposes peace with Israel and objects to Cairo’s close 
relations with the US.36 For the Bush administration democratic alternance was not 
desirable at any cost and certainly not when it threatened to jeopardize Cairo’s 
position as a pro-Western status quo power, a key arbitrator in the Middle East peace 
process and a vital ally in the global fight against Islamist terrorism.37  
A clear indication of this caveat to US democracy promotion in Egypt can be 
found in the pronouncements made by Bush administration officials during the 2005 
parliamentary elections. Indeed, despite the apparent heavy-handedness of the 
Egyptian security forces against the MB in the second and third rounds of voting, the 
US State Department showed little willingness to condemn the violence publicly, let 
alone exert any normative or material pressure on Mubarak to comply with his 
promise of ‘free elections’.38 Instead US officials reiterated the view that Mubarak 
was committed to the pursuit of peaceful elections and that Washington had no reason 
to question this commitment.39 What is more, State Department officials sounded 
remarkably similar to the official position taken by the Egyptian leadership. Explicit 
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reference to the Brotherhood was avoided and its impressive showing at the ballot box 
essentially overlooked. For Washington, as for Cairo, it was not the group that had 
participated and won a significant number of seats in parliament – given that they 
were outlawed as a political party - but independent candidates with no party or 
ideological affiliation. 40  
Because the US and Egypt saw eye to eye on the threat posed by the 
Brotherhood, the Mubarak regime rightly assumed that Washington would impose 
few external costs on any efforts to contain the group’s electoral inroads. Indeed, 
beyond limited condemnations of its election management (something the regime 
could weather) the Bush administration never signalled that it would review its annual 
economic and military aid to Egypt, let alone impose sanctions in response to the 
evident manipulation of the parliamentary poll. For the US, turning a blind eye to 
Egypt’s heavy-handedness was thus seen as the ‘lesser of two evils’ in comparison to 
the prospect of a significantly emboldened Islamist group in parliament.   
In summary, the state’s recourse to violence against the MB in the later phases 
of the 2005 parliamentary poll highlights a number of important facts about the 
current state of Egyptian politics. First, it underscores the doubtful commitment of the 
Mubarak regime to clean elections and more broadly to the pursuit of democratic 
reforms. Indeed, it yet again illustrates that pledges of reform will remain just that 
when critical pillars of authoritarian survival are under attack. Second, it reveals the 
potency of the Muslim Brotherhood as a serious electoral challenger to the regime, 
and the regime’s apparent incapability to tackle its electoral ascendancy by political 
means. Finally, it illustrates that as long as the political threat emanates from forces 
hostile to the US and to close US-Egyptian relations, Washington is unlikely to pursue 
more aggressively its democracy promotion agenda in the Arab world.41 If anything, 
the new Obama administration is likely to reduce even further the pressure of 
democratisation on Arab allies, given the president’s belief in refraining from heavily 
interfering in the domestic politics in the region.     
 
Regime manipulation without violence: Morocco’s 2007 parliamentary election  
Two years after Egypt, on September 7th 2007, Moroccans went to the poll to elect a 
new lower house of parliament. There was a significant degree of expectation both 
domestically and internationally about these elections for two important reasons. First, 
the elections were meant to confirm the steady progress towards democratization that 
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the Kingdom had been making for at least a decade, with the King himself presenting 
them as a watershed. Second, most analysts had predicted that the Islamist Justice and 
Development Party (PJD) would top the polls and there was considerable curiosity as 
to how the King and the Makhzen, which represents an informal governing alliance 
between the monarch, his advisers, selected businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats 
and tribal chiefs operating as the unelected and unaccountable decision-maker in the 
country beyond the control of the elected government, would deal with this scenario. 
Whilst it should be kept in mind that the PJD is generally considered not to be 
antagonistic to the Monarchy, a very high electoral score might have emboldened 
those within the party who would be eager to display a much more forceful opposition 
to the current policies. In any case, it should be underlined that since its entry into 
electoral politics, the PJD has never joined governing coalitions, maintaining 
therefore a degree of distance from both the monarchy and the other political parties.  
On a superficial level, the same domestic and international constraints that 
applied to the Egyptian case were also present in Morocco. The international 
community expected the elections to demonstrate that external support for the 
Monarchy was well founded because King Mohammed VI was indeed moving the 
country towards democracy. Domestically, the elections were lauded as the 
culmination of a process of socio-political change that had seen the King push for a 
progressive liberal reform of the family code, the expansion of a range of civil 
liberties and the creation of a reconciliation commission to investigate past human 
rights abuses.42 The Kingdom would finally move towards substantial political 
reforms, the missing element so far in Mohammed VI’s liberalising agenda.  
The strategy of including Islamist groups into the political and institutional 
game had been a ‘risk’ that King Mohammed VI’s predecessor, Hassan II, had been 
willing to undertake in order to avoid the ‘Algerian scenario’, and he proceeded to 
include the PJD in the parliamentary scene. Mohammed VI continued his father’s 
policy towards the PJD and the party ran in a limited number of constituencies in 
2002 showing considerable strength.43 In 2007 the PJD was allowed to run in all 
constituencies and it was tipped as the inevitable frontrunner. Indeed, most observers 
and the leaders of the other parties expected it to win a clear plurality of both votes 
and seats, and members of the PJD itself were confident of topping the polls, claiming 
that they were ‘able to obtain 70 seats.’44 Obviously, there was no question of the PJD 
winning an absolute majority of the 325 seats in parliament, but even winning the 
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largest share of seats would have caused considerable domestic and international 
anxiety. 
The election campaign officially started only two weeks before polling day 
and it displayed a very interesting feature: the strong involvement of the state in trying 
to boost participation without openly taking sides with any of the parties in 
competition. The mobilisation of the electorate included ‘commercials urging youth to 
fulfil their national and social duty’ and travelling caravans in the countryside to 
increase voter turnout.45 This demonstrates that the King and the Makhzen had a great 
interest in the success of the parliamentary poll because it would reinforce the positive 
external perception of the regime and the self-perception of the ruling elites as 
democratising ones. It is also for this reason that the state apparatus refrained from 
meddling with the electoral process, thus turning the election into what Storm 
describes as the ‘most competitive, free and fair in the country’s history’.46 The 
positive sanctions obtained from the international community and from independent 
monitors also confirm the view that the 2007 elections were indeed a watershed for 
Morocco in terms of freedom and fairness.47  
The proactive role played by the authorities to ensure the elections would pass 
off peacefully and the absence of any interference in the electoral process by the state 
contrast sharply with the Egyptian experience in 2005, although there was significant 
gerrymandering and toleration of a degree of vote buying. Mohammed VI considers 
elections an important legitimising exercise, but a predicted landslide by the PJD was 
a significant risk as it could expose the weakness of the regime. How then does one 
explain the King’s gamble of holding reasonably free and fair elections in the face of 
the expected victory of an Islamist party, which had traditionally sat in opposition and 
had been indicated as morally responsible for the wave of terrorism that Morocco 
experienced in 2003 and 2004? Upon closer inspection, it emerges that the anticipated 
landslide victory of the PJD, which ultimately did not materialise, was not perceived 
as overly problematic for the King and his advisers for a number of reasons.   
First of all, legislative elections in Morocco are not very meaningful because 
they do not fundamentally shift the balance between elected representatives and the 
royal palace. As mentioned previously, this is not the case in Egypt where the 
legislature and the executive have a mutually sustaining relationship. Whilst Denoeux 
posits that the Moroccan legislature is not as toothless as the literature argues and that 
it ‘is making growing contributions to political representation and executive branch 
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oversight’,48 there is no doubt that without far-reaching constitutional reforms the 
executive powers of the King severely limit the chamber’s influence in the political 
system.49 For instance, the King is responsible for appointing the prime minister, but 
he does not have to choose the leader of the party topping the poll for this post. More 
significantly, the King appoints the most important ministers, including Interior and 
Foreign Affairs. These and other constitutional prerogatives make elected officials 
unable to affect significantly the policy-making process because most of the input for 
policy comes directly from the palace or indirectly from the King-appointed 
ministers.50  
Second, Moroccan elections, including those of 2007, are carefully managed 
by the Palace. While it is true that the 2007 contest represented the freest and fairest 
ones in the Kingdom’s history, such elections are not immune from interference. 
Thus, the Palace was able to gerrymander the electoral districts, favouring the 
overrepresentation of the countryside, in order to ensure that the parties loyal to the 
Monarch (les parties du Roi) do well. Also, vote buying was largely tolerated. These 
two instruments were sufficient in many ways in 2007 to manipulate the outcome of 
the elections before they even took place. In addition to these direct tools of 
interference, there are other traits of the Moroccan political system that reinforce the 
ability of the Palace to tolerate and even encourage the participation of potentially 
threatening parties. For example, as Storm convincingly demonstrates, ‘not since the 
first Moroccan parliamentary elections in 1963…has a political party been able to 
obtain more than 15% of the valid votes cast’,51 indicating that the fragmentation of 
the Moroccan party system prevents parties from reaching high individual scores. The 
Moroccan polity is characterised by a tradition of multi-party politics with a number 
of significant cleavages. In the absence of either overt coercion or widespread 
electoral fraud, the 2007 elections simply reflected divisions within Moroccan society 
and the peculiarity of the electoral system which encourages fragmentation. This 
sharply contrasts with the Egyptian party system where the dominant party functions 
as a transmission belt between the presidency and society. In Morocco, political 
parties are technically independent from the executive monarchy, suffering from what 
Willis terms ‘the illusion of significance’.52 They operate in a context where the King 
relies on the wider Makhzen to consolidate his power.  
Another important factor allowing the Palace to be ‘relaxed’ about the 
electoral process is that political Islam in Morocco is not represented primarily by the 
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PJD and therefore both its participation in the electoral process and its score should be 
analysed in this context. Political Islam in Morocco is varied with at least three broad 
trends represented.53 There is the participatory moderate trend of the PJD, which has 
accepted the primacy of the King in the political process and therefore ‘does politics’ 
within the limits set by the monarch. There is also the modern salafi trend linked to 
international violent Islamist networks. Finally there is the radical, but peaceful trend 
represented by the Justice and Charity Group (al Adl). Being the most popular 
Islamist movement in Morocco, the latter group is semi-legal and refuses to partake in 
institutional politics because it would mean legitimising the King as Commander of 
the Faithful, which runs against the conviction of the Group that the monarch has no 
such religious legitimacy.54 This means that ‘the popularity of the fundamental 
opposition rhetoric of Justice and Charity among Islamist constituencies has kept the 
PJD from mobilising wide segments of the disenfranchised population’.55 The 
fragmentation of the Islamist camp is an asset for the regime and its ‘divide and rule’ 
strategies.56 This makes the PJD radically different in terms of threat perception to the 
MB in Egypt. 
Finally, the role of elections in Morocco is to provide a spectacle for 
international consumption and they are not meant to be meaningful expressions of the 
will of the people. Morocco has thrived since independence by being perceived as a 
pluralist polity. The international dimension of the legitimacy of the Moroccan regime 
should not be underestimated and Moroccan monarchs have traditionally been 
responsive to the expectations of the international community. Whilst a significant 
degree of authoritarianism was tolerated during the Cold War as Morocco was an ally 
of Western countries, the international political transformations of the early 1990s and 
social changes within Morocco required a change in the legitimising discourse of the 
Monarchy. The solution was found in the adoption of the language of 
democratization, whereby, under the prudent guidance of the Monarchy Morocco 
would be transiting from authoritarianism to some form of inclusive constitutional 
democracy underpinned by strong political parties and an active civil society. The 
international community encouraged and supported this top-down transition,57 as it 
was in line with its new pro-democracy foreign policies. Upon coming to power 
Mohammed VI deepened the reforms that Hassan II introduced late in his reign and 
presented his vision for Morocco as being based on the dual and mutually reinforcing 
dynamics of democratisation and development.  Mohammed VI is in many ways no 
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different from his father and has continued to integrate Morocco into Western 
economic and political structures, signing a free trade agreement with the US and 
deepening ties with the EU.58 In addition, Morocco has been an important partner in 
the ‘war on terror’. All this has been possible partly because of the appearance of a 
gradual democratisation process taking place in the country. Even when the country 
was ruled with an iron fist by the monarch through the Makhzen, legislative multi-
party elections were held and Léveau defined the country then as having a ‘political 
system based on authoritarian pluralism.’59 Election results were fixed in advance of 
the contest in order for the King to be better able to distribute power and influence a 
complex system of patronage that would ultimately allow him to remain in control of 
most policy-making power. This strategy was quite successful and Hassan II was able 
to survive in power and, as Howe highlighted, ‘Morocco [was] generally respected by 
world powers as a stable constitutional monarchy engaged in the democratic process 
and as an Islamic voice of moderation.’60 Morocco is perceived as an advanced 
‘democratizer’ and this reputation cannot easily be tarnished by electoral violence. In 
this context, legislative elections play an important role and their smooth running, 
fairness and international monitoring constitute a legitimising asset for the monarch. 
This is even more the case precisely because an Islamist party was allowed to run, 
strengthening the impression of genuine political change. Without this reputation, 
Morocco would not be able to extract as many benefits from the international 
community. Some would argue that appearing to be a ‘democratizer’ is not an 
important pre-condition for having good relations with the West and this is generally 
true, as the cases of neighbouring Tunisia and Algeria demonstrate. However, it is 
important to look at where each country stands in terms of international reputation. 
Morocco always thrived on presenting itself as a pluralist society with a multiparty 
system and obviously deviating from that would detract from its reputation. Tunisia 
and Algeria had a very different type of image abroad and therefore probably enjoyed 
more latitude when it comes to their reputation as democratizers.  
The manipulation of the electoral process in 2007 did not paradoxically take 
place during the electoral process itself, as it had done in Egypt. Rather, such 
manipulation is inherent in the Moroccan political system where the constitutional 
role of the King, unelected and unaccountable to popular will, ensures that the elected 
officials have very little weight in determining policy-making. Thus, the 2007 
elections can rightly be labelled free and fair, but certainly not as historic and 
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breaking with the past as they have been presented.61 It follows that analysing the 
results and expecting on that basis to make meaningful inferences about the strength 
of political parties and the political views of ordinary Moroccans is misleading.62 The 
only piece of data that can tell us something about the electoral process is turnout, 
which was a shocking 37 percent in 2007. This sharply contrasted with the efforts by 
the state, the political parties and the King himself to encourage participation after the 
already very low turnout figure of 51.6 percent in the 2002 legislative elections. In 
addition to poor turnout, one fifth of the votes cast were invalid, further reducing the 
percentage of Moroccans who actually participated in such ‘historic elections.’ The 
disaffection of voters towards the political system as a whole indicates that electoral 
contests do not represent an arena for meaningful confrontation and debate, thereby 
decreasing significantly the necessity for the regime to employ violence to fix their 
outcome. Paradoxically, abstention seems beneficial to the monarchy because it 
delegitimises the political parties rather than the monarch, as voters opt out of the 
system leaving the King in his unquestioned position of supreme power over all other 
political actors.    
In conclusion, the absence of violence and of interference in the electoral 
process do not constitute signs of democratisation, but simply indicate that the 
manipulation strategy of the regime sees elections as central elements of international 
legitimacy and they should therefore be conducted with high standards. The 2007 
elections were certainly an improvement on previous contests when vote-buying and 
fraud occurred on a massive scale and when some parties, as was the case for the PJD 
in 2002, were only partially able to compete freely. However, this does not 
substantially modify the decision-making balance in the political system, which is 
heavily tilted towards the monarchy. In this context, it is therefore obvious that 
violence from both state authorities and from autonomous political groups would be 
extremely damaging for the image of Morocco and for its self-perception. On the one 
hand, the monarch and the security apparatus refrain from using violent coercion and, 
increasingly, from practices such as ballot box stuffing because this would send the 
signal that the country is no longer on the road to democracy. On the other hand, 
widespread electoral violence on the part of political movements would indicate not 
only that the state is not in control, but, more crucially, that there is strong opposition 
to elections per se, once again presenting an image of instability that the monarchy is 
very keen to avoid.  
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Conclusion  
Far from being antithetical, elections and violence are often intertwined. This is 
particularly the case, as one would expect, in conflict-ridden societies and liberalising 
countries. It is increasingly, however, a phenomenon that is also encountered in fully-
fledged authoritarian regimes. Whilst there is a significant amount of scholarship 
dealing with the question of why authoritarian leaders even bother holding elections 
in the first place, this article attempts to explain under which conditions rulers employ 
violence once the electoral process has begun. Whilst the electoral potency of the 
opposition is certainly an important element in the rational calculus that rulers make 
when deciding to employ or refrain from the use of force in elections, there are other 
factors that need to be taken into account. It is necessary first of all to analyse the 
relative importance of the institution for which elections are called for. Second, there 
is the need to examine the alternatives that a regime has in order to influence the 
outcome of elections. Finally, in an increasingly interdependent world, one has to take 
into account the reactions of the international community.  
The cases of the legislative elections in Egypt in 2005 and in Morocco in 2007 
provide strong empirical evidence for the validity of the theoretical framework built 
around the three variables outlined above. Within this framework, it is quite 
unsurprising that the Mubarak regime decided to resort to violence to manage the 
2005 legislative elections. The importance of parliament in the Egyptian institutional 
setting, the absence of alternatives to violence such as fraud so late in the game and 
the knowledge of the support from the international community for the crackdown 
compounded the electoral potency of the Muslim Brotherhood. The use of violence 
was both rational and effective. The absence of electoral violence in Morocco is 
equally unsurprising given the weak role parliament plays in the Moroccan political 
system, the existence of viable alternatives to influence the outcome and the reliance 
of Morocco on an international image of a much stronger ‘democratiser’ than Egypt. 
Unlike in the Egyptian case, electoral violence would undermine the Moroccan 
regime. The paradox of it all is that the rulers of Morocco and Egypt share similar 
domestic and international constraints and they should therefore behave in a similar 
manner when faced with domestic challenges. This is obviously not the case and as 
Albrecht and Wegner highlighted in their work on Islamism in the two countries, 
institutions matter63 and significantly influence choices like the use of violence during 
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elections. The findings from Morocco and Egypt point to the necessity of looking 
beyond the threat of opposition potency when explaining electoral violence and they 
can be used to better understand how political institutions shape the responses of 
rulers facing similar domestic challenges.  
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